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Ambiguity towards Multiple Historical Performance
Information Signals: Evidence from Indonesian Open-Ended
Mutual Fund Investors
Haris Pratama Loeis* and Ruslan Prijadi

Department of Management, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia
This study focuses on the behavior of open-ended mutual fund investors when encountered with
multiple information signals of mutual fund’s historical performance. The behavior of investors can
be reflected on their decision to subscribe or redeem their funds from mutual funds. Moreover, we observe the presence of ambiguity within investors due to multiple information signals, and their reaction towards it. We apply a Fama-McBeth Regression technique for equity mutual funds, fixed income
mutual funds, and balanced mutual funds that are effective during the period of February 2010 until
February 2015. Our finding shows that open-ended mutual fund investors do not only have sensitivity towards past performance information signals, but also have additional sensitivity towards the
ambiguity of multiple information signals. Because of the presence of ambiguity, investors consider
more on negative information signals and the worst information signal in their investment decisions.
Keywords: Open-ended mutual fund; multiple information signals; fund flows; information ambiguity

Introduction
Recent advancements in information technology have driven both the efficiency in information seeking related costs and also an
increase for individual access towards information. While increasing information accessibility were pursued and intended to fruit positive
impacts, these advancements have also been
followed by negative impacts. Modern investors are now exposed to expanding information quantities, without the existence of any
party who can fully insure the reliability and
relevance of the information made available to
investors. Schinckus (2011) stated that these
advancements lead modern investors to experience information overload.
Skepticism towards the reliability and relevance of information would stimulate investors

to question the quality of information. This may
become a problem since valuating the quality
of information is not a widely held skill-set
among investors. When faced with a series of
information with unknown quality, that information series would be judged as ambiguous
(Epstein & Schneider, 2008). Furthermore, information ambiguity would urge investors to
make investment decisions based on historical
performance as an indicator, which is a lag indicator (Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, &
Zame, 2010).
A common practice for Indonesian Investment Managers is to publish a monthly fund
fact sheet, composed of a number of facts regarding a mutual fund, including its historical
performance. In most cases, historical performance is informed as a mutual fund’s performance in the past 1 month, 3 months, 6 months,
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Table 1. Example of Multiple Information Signals in Selected Indonesian Mutual Funds (as
of January 2014)
Mutual Fund
Batavia Dana Saham Optimal
Grow-2-Prosper
Panin Dana Prima
Kresna Indeks 45
RHB OSK Alpha Sector Rotation
Danareksa Mawar Komoditas 10
Sam Indonesian Equity
First State Indo Equity High Conviction
Simas Saham Unggulan

Performance
1 Month
0.67%
6.29%
0.22%
0.89%
0.84%
-1.23%
0.09%
5.56%
-1.54%

3 Months
-0.06%
5.49%
-1.11%
-0.21%
0.15%
2.22%
-1.42%
1.59%
0.87%

6 Months
-1.84%
2.49%
-2.75%
-2.11%
-1.83%
0.06%
-2.53%
-0.63%
-0.25%

12 Months
0.53%
2.11%
0.24%
-0.42%
0.51%
-1.07%
1.11%
1.13%
0.15%

Notes: This table compiles historical performance information of a number of mutual funds as of January 2014, publicized in each fund’s fact
sheet. The data is retrieved from the ARIA Bapepepam-LK database.

and 12 months. In other words, investors are
exposed to multiple information signals in a
single publication. Following the concept of
heuristics in Shefrin (2002), the delivery of a
fund’s historical performance as a vocal point
in a fund fact sheet may lead to investment decisions based on lagging indicators, reflected in
their decisions to subscribe (or redeem) their
investments to (or from) a mutual fund. This
claim is empirically proven in Sirri and Tuffano (1998), which documents performance
chasing behavior among mutual fund investors,
who tend to invest in winning funds and redeem
from losing funds, in regard to the historical
performance information of the mutual fund in
question. Similar findings are also documented
in Benson and Humphry (2008), Guercio and
Tkac (2008), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), Jank
and Wedow (2013), and Li, Tiwari, and Tong
(2013).
The delivery of historical performance information regarding a mutual fund in the form
of multiple information signals may not only
lead investors to possess a performance chasing behavior, but may also lead to ambiguity
among investors. Existence of the difference in
monthly average raw returns between historical performance information is not only a possibility, but also commonly found in fund fact
sheets. For example, Table 1 shows the historical performance of a number of mutual funds
operating in Indonesia as of January 2014. The
historical performance information is reported
as the performance of each fund in four different time horizons, publicized in a single report-
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ing period. Information in Table 1 shows that
there is a significant difference between all four
historical performance information, even if adjusted to simple monthly average returns. This
practice promotes ambiguity among investors
by expanding the quantity of information accessible to investors, without informing which
information may be most relevant to them.
This paper intends to contribute to the existing literature on mutual fund investor behavior
by documenting two key aspects. First, we attempt to document the presence of performance
chasing behavior within investors in Indonesia.
There is an emerging urgency to specifically
document the behavior of Indonesian investors;
since recent findings suggest that different clienteles show different flow-performance reactions and most existing empirical studies focus
on US investors (Keswani & Stolin, 2012). For
this objective, we employ a Fama-MacBeth Regression for the empirical model proposed by
Sirri and Tuffano (1998) and enhanced in Benson and Humphry (2008), Guercio and Tkac
(2008), Huang et al. (2007), Jank and Wedow
(2013), and Li et al. (2013).
Second, we conduct additional testing to
document the presence of ambiguity among investors as a result of the existence of multiple
information signals. Developments for the empirical model are conducted by applying theoretical frameworks concerning loss aversion
(Ahn, Choi, Gale, & Kariv, 2014; Barberis &
Huang, 2001; Coval & Shumway, 2005; Shefrin & Statman, 1985) and ambiguity aversion
(Epstein & Schneider, 2008; Ju & Miao, 2012;
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Klibanoff, Marinacci, & Mukerji, 2005).
The following sections of this paper are organized as follows. Next section provides relevant literature reviews, followed by an explanation of the empirical methodology in Section
3. Findings of the tests we conduct are reported
and discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is
composed of concluding remarks.

Literature Review
There is an increasing urgency to understand
the impact and pattern of information distribution, as information technology is rapidly advancing. The increasing access of investors towards information sources is judged as a major
problem as people possess limitations in measuring information quality. Mauboussin (2007)
stated that the increasing amount of information only brings small to no positive effects for
investors, as investors have limitations in (i)
weighting information, (ii) not depending on
one source of information, and (iii) recognizing
knowledge already possessed by the market.
The limitations to measure the quality and relevance of information signals would urge information signals to be considered as ambiguous
(Epstein & Schneider, 2008).
There is currently a limited line of literatures
discussing the impact of mutual fund historical performance information towards mutual
fund flows. One of the earliest studies was Sirri
and Tufano (1998), which explored a number of determinants for fund flows of mutual
funds. This paper coined the term ‘performance
chasing behavior’, due to the behavior of mutual fund investors to give a disproportionately
high consideration towards historical annual
performance. Investors tend to place their investments to funds with superior annual performance, and conversely redeeming their investment from underperforming funds (Hazenberg,
Irek, van der Scheer, & Stefanova, 2015; Huang
et al., 2007; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). This pattern
is considered as a behavioral bias as historical performance is reported as raw returns, not
risk-adjusted returns.
Similar findings were documented in Huang
et al. (2007) that additionally found the exist-
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ence of mutual fund sensitivity towards historical monthly performance. Furthermore, Benson and Humphry (2008) and Jank and Wedow
(2013) continued this literature line by using
multiple information signals, by simultaneously testing for annual and monthly historical
performances as dependent variables to understand investor behavior, eventually finding the
same behavioral bias. Bailey, Kumar, and Ng
(2011) argued that these performance-chasing
behaviors by investor appear more suitably as
behavioral biases, rather than a rational inference to valuate the investor manager’s skill
using past performances as an indicator. This
behavior is not only possessed by mutual fund
investors, but also hedge fund investors (Ramadorai, 2013).
Moreover, the existence of multiple information signals delivered to investors in a single
publication may lead to ambiguity (Epstein &
Schneider, 2008; Ju & Miao, 2012; Klibanoff
et al., 2005; Li et al., 2013). The implication of
multiple information signals is there is an existence of ambiguity aversion among investors,
which urges investors to have additional sensitivity towards the worst-case scenario when
evaluating a mutual fund. When investors are
exposed to multiple information signals with
unknown quality, the worst information signal
would be weighted more in making investment
decisions.
Besides ambiguity aversion, another behavioral bias that is possessed by investors due to
the ambiguity of information is an existence of
loss aversion. Evidence in Ahn et al. (2014),
Barberis and Huang (2001), Coval and Shumway (2001), and Shefrin and Statman (1985)
show that investors have a tendency to be loss
averse. This can be shown by the tendency of
investors to have a larger and quicker reaction
in selling their assets, if that particular asset has
a negative performance. While these literatures
were not tested for mutual fund investors, but
the existence of multiple information signals
exposed to mutual fund investors in Indonesia drives the urgency for this framework to be
tested in the Indonesian mutual fund market
setting.

3

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [2015], Art. 3
Loeis and Prijadi

Research Methods
Data
Data of mutual fund performance and mutual fund flows are collected using the EikonThomsonReuters services. Additionally we use
the database provided by the Indonesian financial services authority (OJK) to identify the mutual funds that are listed and operating in Indonesia. We use all open-ended mutual funds that
are classified as equity mutual funds, fixed income mutual funds, and balanced mutual funds,
which are listed as effective during the period of
February 2010 until February 2015 in the OJK
database. Open-ended mutual funds are chosen
as they give minimum restrictions for investor
to subscribe or redeem investments, so investor behavior could be observed. Mutual funds
classified as equity mutual funds, fixed income
mutual funds, and balanced mutual funds are
chosen because their similar characteristics besides their main investment type, so comparison between testing results could be conducted.
We use monthly data of the February 2010
until February 2015 period, resulting in 61
monthly sample periods. We decide to use
monthly data since fund fact sheets of mutual
funds in Indonesia are reported on a monthly
basis. There are 183 observation periods, or 61
observation periods for each mutual fund class.
In order to prevent extreme values of mutual
fund flows, we only include data for a mutual
fund after it is aged one year old. As an additional preventive measure, data of the last
month before a mutual fund liquidation date is
also excluded.

Methodology
Empirical models in this paper are used to
estimate the sensitivity of mutual fund investors towards historical performance information signals. Since we relate monthly fund
flows to historical performance measures, the
cross-sectional estimation would potentially be
highly autocorrelated. In order to prevent this
problem, we apply a Fama-MacBeth Regression technique by conducting a cross-sectional
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regression for each observation period and reporting the time-series average value for each
coefficient. In order to observe the behavior of
equity mutual fund, fixed income mutual fund,
and balanced mutual fund investors, we regress
each mutual fund category separately, consistent with Huang et al. (2012). Additionally, we
also report the significance level and t-statistic
value. In each observation period, we exclude
the top and bottom 1% data from the observation period. Additionally, we would like to note
that the estimation process for each empirical
model is conducted with the technique stated
above.
Applying the model and framework proposed by Benson and Humphry (2008), Guercio
and Tkac (2008), Huang et al. (2007), Jank and
Wedow (2013), Li et al. (2013), and Sirri and
Tuffano (1998), investors sensitivity towards
historical performance information signals
could be estimated using the following model:
Flowp,t = α+β1Perf1mp,t+β2Perf3mp,t
+β3Perf6mp,t+β4Perf12mp,t
		
+Controls+ep,t
		

(1)

Where Flowp,t is the growth of the Net Asset Value (NAV) of mutual fund p during period t adjusted for internal growth; Perf1mp,t,
Perf3mp,t, Perf6mp,t, and Perf12mp,t is the historical performance information of a mutual
fund for the past 1 month, 3 months, 6 months,
and 12 months, respectively; and in Controls
we incorporate other factor premiums of asset
pricing as control variables, which are fund age,
fund size, and fund volatility.
On an additional note, the operational definition we use for Flowp,t follows the same approach as a number of literatures about mutual
fund flows (Benson & Humphry, 2008; Chevalier & Ellison, 1997; Huang et al., 2007; Li et
al., 2013; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). The value of
Flowp,t is calculated using the following approach:
Flowp,t = NetSubp,t+NAVp,t

(2)

Where NAVp,t is the fee-adjusted NAV of mutual fund p on period t, and NetSubp,t is the value
95
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of net subscriptions1. Following this approach
allows us to find the growth of a mutual fund
adjusted of internal growth, or the growth of a
fund’s NAV because of factors besides fund inflow and fund outflow (e.g. realized and unrealized gain (loss) of the portfolio). Spiegel and
Zhang (2013) proposed an alternative approach
by using market share2 as the dependent variable. Although this approach is still questionable
since there is still limited evidence that mutual
fund investors exclusively only invest in mutual funds.
In order to apply the concept of loss aversion, documented in Ahn et al. (2014), Barberis and Huang (2001), Coval and Shumway
(2001), and Shefrin and Statman (1985), we
adjusted the base empirical model stated in
Equation 1. Controlling variables Perf1mp,t,
Perf3mp,t, Perf6mp,t, and Perf12mp,t, for negative
values allows us to observe the additional sensitivity of investors when exposed to negative
historical performance of mutual funds. The
adjustment of the base model is stated in the
following equation:
Flowp,t = α+β1Perf1mp,t+β2Perf3mp,t
+β3Perf6mp,t+β4Perf12mp,t
		
+γ1Perf1mp,t xD1+γ2Perf3mp,t xD2
		
+γ3Perf6mp,t xD3+γ4Perf12mp,t xD4
		
+Controls+ep,t
(3)
		
Where the dummy variables equal to 1 if the
historical performance information is negative,
and equal to 0 if otherwise.
Furthermore, we also adjust the base empirical model to observe the additional sensitivity
of investors towards the worst-case scenario,
applying the framework of Epstein and Schneider (2008), Ju and Miao (2012), and Klibanoff
et al. (2005). This adjustment is done by adding
MinRankp,t to the model. The adjustment of the
base model is stated in the following equation:
Flowp,t = α+β1Perf1mp,t+β2Perf3mp,t
+β3Perf6mp,t+β4Perf12mp,t
		
+θMinRankp,t+Controls+ep,t
		
1
2

(4)

Where MinRankp,t is the value of the worst historical performance information signal between
all four historical performance information.
Operationally, we calculate MinRankp,t following the notation in Equation 5.
MinRankp,t = Min ( Perf1mp,t , Perf3mp,t ,
		
Perf6mp,t , Perf12mp,t )

(5)

Results and Discussions
Sensitivity of Investors towards Multiple
Historical Performance Information Signals
The initial step for this research is to test the
sensitivity of investors when exposed to multiple information signals. We estimate investor
sensitivity using the model stated in Equation
1. Our findings show that both equity mutual
fund and balanced mutual fund investors have
sensitivity to 1 month and 12 months historical
performance information (Table 2).
The findings shown in Table 2 are in line with
the findings documented in Benson and Humphry (2008), which found that both monthly
and annual historical performance information
is a determinant for mutual fund flows. On the
other hand, historical performance for the past 3
months and 6 months do not significantly affect
mutual fund investor’s decisions. The appearance of investors sensitivity towards past performance information signals are considered a
behavioral bias, as these information signals are
not reported as risk-adjusted returns, but given
disproportionately high consideration for investment decisions (Bailey et al., 2011; Huang
et al., 2007; Sirri & Tufano, 1998). In addition,
the high aggresivity of Indonesian mutual fund
investors in reacting to historical performance
information, indicated by significance at a 1%
level for a number of performance variables, is
argued to be a result of the low development
level of Indonesia’s financial market, financial
literacy, and mutual fund industry (Ferreira,
Keswani, Miguel, & Ramos, 2012).
The coefficient of Perf12M for equity mutual funds equals to 0.0659. This value implies

Calculated as Subscriptionsp,t - Redemptionsp,t
Calculated as NAVp,t / NAVt

96
Published by UI Scholars Hub, 2015

5

The Indonesian Capital Market Review, Vol. 7, No. 2 [2015], Art. 3
Loeis and Prijadi

Table 2. Estimation Results for the Sensitivity of Investors towards Multiple Information
Signals
Perf1M
Perf3M
Perf6M
Perf12M
Age
Size
Vol
Intercept
Cross-Sections
Periods
R-Squared
Durbin-Watson Stat

Equity Mutual Funds
0.0329 **
(3.0474)
0.0024
(0.2533)
0.0052
(1.2123)
0.0659 **
(5.0591)
-0.0548 *
(-2.4911)
-0.0658 **
(-8.8192)
-0.0209 **
(-5.8444)
0.4993 **
(5.6308)
122
61
0.1005
1.6854

Fixed Income Mutual Funds
0.0058
(0.9179)
0.0004
(0.0274)
0.0192
(0.9687)
0.0507*
(2.4895)
-0.0082
(-1.3461)
-0.0434**
(-6.2989)
0.0001
(0.3205)
0.0035
(0.3327)
124
61
0.0490
1.8096

Balanced Mutual Funds
0.0087*
(1.9869)
0.0171
(0.1152)
0.0048
(0.3539)
0.0425**
(2.8648)
-0.0391*
(-2.3720)
-0.0256**
(-3.5306)
-0.0096**
(-3.5674)
0.2666**
(4.0029)
118
61
0.0586
1.7756

Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, along with t-statistics (in parenthesis), R2, and Durbin-Watson Stat. The * and ** symbol
denotes significance at the 5% and 1 % level, respectively.

that for equity mutual funds, a 1% increase
in 12 months performance of a mutual fund
would be followed by an increase of fund flows
amounting to 0.07% of the mutual fund’s NAV
by assuming that other factors are constant. The
same interpretation method could be applied to
the coefficients of other variables that have a
significant value.
Different results are found for fixed income
mutual fund investors, where investors are found
to have sensitivity only towards 12 months historical performance information. This indicates
that fixed income mutual fund investors only
weigh long term performance information in
making investment decisions. From a practical
stand point, one explanation for this finding is
the investor target market for this mutual fund
category, as fixed income mutual funds in Indonesia are mainly targeted for investors with
long term investment preferences. Result differences between fund types are understandable, since each mutual fund type has different
objectives and are offered to different types of
investors. Investors are also heterogeneous and
unequally distributed among mutual fund types
(Cashman, Nardari, Deli, & Villupuram, 2014).
Different results between mutual fund types are
also found in the subsequent steps of this paper.
https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/icmr/vol7/iss2/3
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Additional Sensitivity towards Negative Historical Performance Information Signals
In this step, we control for negative historical performance information signals, by applying the model stated in Equation 3. The results
in Table 3 show that equity mutual fund and
balanced mutual investors possess an additional sensitivity towards all four historical performance information signals, if the information is
valued negative. For example, a 1% increase in
a balanced mutual fund 6 month historical performance with a positive value would yield in
an increase of fund flows amounting to 0.0341%
of the mutual fund’s NAV, but if the 6 month
historical performance is valued negative, a 1%
increase would yield an decrease of fund flows
amounting to 0.0099% [(0.0341-0.0440) x 1%]
of the mutual fund’s NAV by assuming that
other factors are constant. In this case, investors respond to negative information signals by
punishing the mutual fund with redeeming their
investments (Jank & Wedow, 2013).
The results in Table 3 also show a difference
in the behavior of fixed income mutual fund investors, where these investors are only sensitive
to negative values of 12 months performance
signals. Consistent with the findings in Table 2,
97
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Table 3. Estimation Results for the Additional Sensitivity of Investors towards Negative
Information Signals
Perf1M
Perf3M
Perf6M
Perf12M
DPerf1M
DPerf3M
DPerf6M
DPerf12M
Age
Size
Vol
Intercept
Cross-Sections
Periods
R-Squared
Durbin-Watson Stat

Equity Mutual Funds
0.0336**
(3.4654)
0.0207*
(2.0642)
0.0165*
(2.1933)
0.0808**
(3.9722)
-0.0651**
(-4.2703)
-0.0161*
(-2.6378)
-0.0573*
(-2.2617)
-0.0844**
(-4.3444)
-0.0635**
(-3.2702)
-0.0524**
(-7.9349)
-0.0187**
(-5.9172)
0.4267**
(5.4449)
122
61
0.2708
1.8195

Fixed Income Mutual Funds
0.0048
(0.4577)
0.0229
(1.0149)
0.0293
(0.9838)
0.0613*
(2.0421)
-0.0014
(-0.1008)
-0.0371
(-1.2141)
-0.0194
(-0.4211)
-0.0290*
(-2.5439)
0.0079
(1.2934)
-0.0424**
(-6.1268)
0.0001
(0.2914)
0.0070
(0.6653)
124
61
0.0599
1.8102

Balanced Mutual Funds
0.0165*
(1.9610)
0.0211*
(2.0204)
0.0341*
(2.2727)
0.0545**
(3.4221)
-0.0148*
(-2.0045)
-0.0440*
(-2.1856)
-0.0899*
(-2.5558)
-0.0768**
(-4.3942)
-0.0209*
(-2.2423)
-0.0213**
(-2.9511)
-0.0089**
(-3.3314)
0.2132**
(3.2055)
118
61
0.1583
1.7827

Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, along with t-statistics (in parenthesis), R2, and Durbin-Watson Stat. The * and ** symbol denotes significance at the 5% and 1 % level, respectively.

fixed income mutual fund investors still do not
possess sensitivity to short-term historical performance information signals, although those
signals are valued negative.
Results found in this step show that there is
ambiguity among investors when reacting to
multiple historical performance information
signals. Investor ambiguity is reflected by the
presence of the additional sensitivity that investors possess towards negative information
signals. Investors are not well prepared in facing short-term fluctuations of assets that they
perceive to be highly potential (Shefrin & Statman, 1985). Another explanation is that investors tend to quickly withdraw their investments
before other investors do, as they fear the damaging effect when other investors redeem their
investments and push the fund to sell its assets
at discount (Chen, Goldstein, & Jiang, 2010).
As a result, when exposed to negative information signals, investors give a greater amount
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of consideration to these information signals
compared to positive information signals when
making an investment decision (Barberis &
Huang, 2001; Coval & Shumway, 2005; Jank &
Wedow, 2013). Hence, indicating a behavioral
bias of loss aversion that mutual fund investors
possess.
Additional Sensitivity towards the Worst
Historical Performance Information Signal
Furthermore, we also control for the worst
historical performance between all four information signals, by applying the model stated
in Equation 4. We found similar behaviors for
mutual investors in all three categories (Table
4), where investors possess additional sensitivity towards the worst information signal. This
result indicates that there is a presence of ambiguity among investors in reacting towards multiple information signals, by giving additional

7
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Table 4. Estimation Results for the Additional Sensitivity of Investors towards the Worst
Information Signal
Perf1M
Perf3M
Perf6M
Perf12M
MinRank
Age
Size
Vol
Intercept
Cross-Sections
Periods
R-Squared
Durbin-Watson Stat

Equity Mutual Funds
0.0424**
(3.7436)
0.0198*
(2.0265)
0.0210*
(2.3074)
0.0716**
(5.4276)
0.0366**
(2.7202)
-0.0738**
(-3.2018)
-0.0653**
(-8.7638)
-0.0211**
(-5.9051)
0.4804**
(5.4055)
122
61
0.1526
1.6872

Fixed Income Mutual Funds
0.0063
(0.7586)
0.0001
(0.0086)
0.0196
(0.9653)
0.0512*
(2.4401)
0.0311*
(2.0949)
0.0082
(1.3452)
-0.0434**
(-6.2879)
0.0001
(0.3221)
0.0036
(0.3423)
124
61
0.0591
1.8099

Balanced Mutual Funds
0.0372**
(4.9051)
0.0207*
(2.0629)
0.0270*
(2.3556)
0.0597**
(3.9303)
0.0670**
(4.9004)
-0.0297*
(-1.9746)
-0.0256**
(-3.5457)
-0.0093**
(-3.4433)
0.2303**
(3.4451)
118
61
0.0833
1.7837

Notes: This table reports the coefficient value, along with t-statistics (in parenthesis), R2, and Durbin-Watson Stat. The * and ** symbol denotes significance at the 5% and 1 % level, respectively.

weight towards the worst information signal in
making investment decisions (Epstein & Schneider, 2008; Ju & Miao, 2012; Klibanoff et al.,
2005; Li et al., 2014).
Results show that for a fixed income mutual
fund, a 1% increase of the 12 month historical
performance information would be reacted by
investors with an increase of fund flows amounting to 0.0512% of the mutual fund’s NAV. Additionally, if that information was also the worst
information signal between all four information
signals, a 1% increase of the 12 month historical performance information would be reacted
by investors with an increase of fund flows
amounting to 0.0823% [(0.0512+0.0311) x 1%]
of the mutual fund’s NAV by assuming that other factors are constant..
Moreover, this result also indicates that investors take account information signals that
are normally insignificant to them, when that
particular information was also the worst information signal. For a fixed income mutual
fund investor, test results indicate that the 1
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month historical performance information
would not be considered in making investment
decisions, except when the 1 month historical
performance information was also the worst
information signal. This is a form of response
by investors towards the ambiguity of multiple information signals. Given the uncertainty
in regard of the quality of multiple information
signals (as shown in Table 1), investors do not
update their decision making process in a standard Bayesian fashion (Ju & Miao, 2012). Investors fail to consider that each information signal
is not independent to one another and has a high
level of auto-correlation (Epstein & Schneider,
2008), promoting the ambiguity level of these
information signals. Since the level of amibuity
and fund flows are negatively correlated (Antoniou, Harris, & Zhang, 2015), investors tend
to redeem their investments from ambiguous
funds. As a result, ambiguity averse investors
tend to prefer mutual funds that show consistent
information signals and place a greater weight
on the worst information signal (Li et al., 2014).
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Conclusion
This study attempts to investigate the behavior of mutual fund investors in Indonesia,
particularly when exposed to multiple historical
information signals. Applying the framework
proposed by Sirri and Tuffano (1998), we found
evidence that mutual fund investors in Indonesia possess a performance chasing behavior. Investors are found to be sensitive towards historical performance information signals, reflected
in their decision to subscribe (redeem) their investments to (from) mutual funds. As historical
performance information signals are delivered
as multiple information signals, we also found
that not all information signals are significant
for investors in making investment decisions.
Equity mutual fund and balanced mutual fund
investors are sensitive towards 1 month and 12
months historical performance information signals, while fixed income mutual fund investors
are only sensitive towards the 12 months historical performance information signal.
Additionally, we found that exposing investors to multiple information signals also
promotes ambiguity for investors in reacting
towards multiple information signals. We used
two approaches in investigating ambiguity
among investors. In the first approach, we applied the loss aversion concept, proposed in Ahn
et al. (2014), Barberis and Huang (2001), Coval
and Shumway (2001), and Shefrin and Statman (1985). The application of this approach
found that investors have additional sensitivity
when exposed to negative information signals.

Meanwhile, in the second approach, we applied
the concept proposed in Epstein and Schneider (2008), Ju and Miao (2012), and Klibanoff
et al. (2005), regarding ambiguity aversion of
investors. This approach resulted in additional
evidence that there is ambiguity among mutual
fund investors when exposed to multiple information signals, where investors have additional
sensitivity towards the worst information signal.
Findings of this research have three main
managerial implications. First, it should be
taken to account that fund subscription and redemption decisions by investors can directly
influence the cash flow of a mutual fund. By
understanding the impact on historical performance on mutual fund flows, Investment Managers can conduct better cash and portfolio
management. Second, as the government regulations in Indonesia about which historical performance information that should be publicized
is currently non-existent, Investment Managers have the ability to constantly adjust which
information would be exposed to investors in
their upcoming fund fact sheet. Understanding
how investors would react towards information
and adjusting information displayed in the fund
fact sheet based on this understanding could increase (decrease) potential fund subscriptions
(redemptions). Third, estimating future mutual
fund flows can be beneficial for Investment
Managers and other investors, as mutual fund
flows create temporary price pressure in the
capital market (Ben-Raphael, Kandel, & Wohl,
2011).
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